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Abstract:  Relationships between intermediaries and their customers have become increasingly
important in recent years. This paper argues that the need for costly ex ante information
acquisition and analysis is a major barrier to the participation of investors and firms in
sophisticated markets. Long-term relationships between intermediaries and their customers,
in which intermediaries provide implicit insurance to customers, can be an effective substitute
for costly ex ante investigation. In this way, intermediaries allow firms and investors to reap
the benefits of financial markets. Relationships are easiest to sustain when the ongoing
benefits to both parties are high. As a result competition may lower the benefits that can be












Relationships between intermediaries and their customers have become increasingly
important in recent years. This paper argues that the need for costly ex ante informa-
tion acquisition and analysis is a major barrier to the participation of investors and
¯rms in sophisticated markets. Long-term relationships between intermediaries and
their customers, in which intermediaries provide implicit insurance to customers, can
be an e®ective substitute for costly ex ante investigation. In this way, intermediaries
allow ¯rms and investors to reap the bene¯ts of ¯nancial markets. Relationships are
easiest to sustain when the ongoing bene¯ts to both parties are high. As a result
competition may lower the bene¯ts that can be obtained from relationships.
1 Introduction
The ¯nancial services industry has undergone a dramatic transformation in recent decades.
What might be termed the traditional paradigm for intermediation is illustrated in Figure 1.
Banks and insurance companies conveyed funds from low wealth households to ¯rms. High
wealth households and large companies used ¯nancial markets directly. The primary role
of intermediaries was perceived to be reducing transaction costs and providing information.
Markets and intermediaries were alternative ways of channelling funds.
One aspect of the transformation has been the increase in importance of traditional
¯nancial markets in the U.S., such as those for equity and debt. For example, the market
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1capitalization of corporate equity in the U.S. has risen steadily as a percentage of GDP, from
around 50 per cent in 1975 to nearly 75 per cent in 1994 (OECD-Financial Market Trends,
#62, November, 1995). Another aspect is that the range of markets available has widened
with the development of liquid options, ¯nancial futures, and other derivative markets.
Despite a signi¯cant fall in the direct costs of trading after the deregulation of commis-
sions on the New York Stock Exchange in the early 1970s and the increased availability of
information, this expansion in the importance of ¯nancial markets is not because of higher
participation by individuals or ¯rms. In fact, the share of individual ownership of corporate
equity in the U.S. has fallen during the period 1967-1995. There was a particularly sharp
change in the early 1980s, when individual ownership fell from over 75 per cent to around
50 per cent in only a few years (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System-Flow of
Funds Accounts).
The change has occurred because intermediaries are using markets more extensively than
before. Over the period 1967-1995, the share of pension funds' ownership of equity in the
U.S. has risen from less than 10 per cent to over 20 per cent. In the same period, the
share of mutual funds' ownership of equity in the U.S. has grown from around ¯ve per cent
to nearly 25 per cent (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System-Flow of Funds
Accounts). In derivatives markets, intermediaries play an even more signi¯cant role. As
of 1995, ¯nancial institutions accounted for 82 percent of the notional amounts of OTC
derivatives outstanding while non-¯nancial institutions accounted for the remaining 18 per
cent (Bank for International Settlements-Central Bank Survey of Derivatives Market Activity
1995).
Figure 2 illustrates what might be termed the emerging paradigm for intermediation that
these changes are leading to. Most households increasingly deal with intermediaries, such
as pension and mutual funds that invest on their behalf in markets. Even among the very
wealthy, the use of private banking services and hedge funds, where advisors make investment
decisions on behalf of their clients, has become increasingly common. Small ¯rms deal with
banks and other entities, such as limited partnerships providing venture capital and other
forms of private equity. Only the very largest ¯rms deal directly in ¯nancial markets and
even then advisors are increasingly used.
Allen and Santomero (1997) have suggested that the focus of intermediaries' activities
has shifted away from reducing transaction costs and providing information. Instead, risk
management has become an increasingly important activity. Intermediaries are using the
wide range of markets available to them to transfer, transform and redistribute risk. Un-
derstanding the practice and role of risk management has become the center of a growing
literature (see Allen and Santomero (1997) and the references therein). Figure 2 illustrates
that in the emerging paradigm of intermediation the increased importance of risk manage-
ment is only one part of the change in the ¯nancial services industry that has occurred.
Another part is the increase in the interaction of intermediaries with households and ¯rms.
Why have these changes in the ¯nancial services industry occurred? In this paper, we
argue that one of the most important factors is the rising costs of participating in ¯nancial
markets. In particular, new markets have opened up and made new hedging opportunities
2available, but at the same time they have increased the expertise necessary to devise strate-
gies and make e®ective use of these opportunities. So while tangible transaction costs in the
form of fees and commissions may have fallen, information costs have increased.
Traditionally, the role of intermediaries is explained in terms of the existence of increasing
returns to scale in executing transactions, monitoring investments, and acquiring informa-
tion. Because there are ¯xed costs involved in each of these activities, a specialist institution
can reduce the per unit expense for investors. However, the development of more sophis-
ticated markets has provided a di®erent role for intermediaries. To evaluate a complex
security, a complex portfolio, or a complex strategy requires more than just knowing \the
facts" about a ¯rm's balance sheet. It requires ¯nancial expertise that an ordinary investor
usually does not possess. Even large ¯rms may lack this expertise. So intermediaries assume
the role of advisors, who bridge the gap between the investors' lack of knowledge and the
expertise required to get the most out of sophisticated markets.
Thus, intermediaries play a crucial role in allowing ¯rms and investors to participate in
¯nancial markets and, at the same time, ensure that ¯nancial markets have enough depth
to survive. In this sense, ¯nancial markets and ¯nancial intermediaries have a symbiotic
relationship. Each is necessary to the other. Without intermediaries, the informational
barriers to participation would prevent investors from reaping the bene¯ts of the new markets
and the markets themselves might not survive. At the same time, ¯nancial markets reduce
costs for the intermediaries and their customers and allow them to hedge risks more e®ectively
than they previously could.
However, the idea that intermediaries provide expertise that ordinary investors lack
presents a problem because, if the investors lack the expertise to perform the functions
of the intermediary, how can they be sure that the intermediary is providing them with a
good service? An intermediary can advise a customer about what to do even though the cus-
tomer is not very knowledgeable about ¯nancial matters. But how does the customer know
that he is being given the correct advice? The advisor may have an incentive to shirk, for
example, by not collecting precise information, or the advisor may be giving inappropriate
advice, because he does not understand the customer's hedging needs or risk tolerance.
We will argue that, to some extent, such problems can be overcome in the context of
a long-term relationship, in which the intermediary will compensate the customer for bad
outcomes ifthey reveal either a misunderstanding of what was expected fromthe relationship,
or some actual failure by the intermediary to provide an acceptable level of service. Since
the customer is not fully informed about the possibilities explicit contracts are not possible
and assurances must be implicit. Thus implicit contracts necessarily play an important role
in our theory.
Similar situations can arise in non-¯nancial transactions and many of the arguments
developed in this paper may have applications to a wider range of economic phenomena.
In many principal-agent relationships the principal engages an agent precisely because the
principal lacks relevant knowledge and expertise. For example, a patient going to see a
doctor or a consumer planning to purchase a computer might face informational problems
that are similar to those of an investor trading a complex security. However, we believe
3that the informational problems arising from ¯nancial transactions are of a di®erent order of
magnitude and this makes the setting a particularly important one to consider this issue. The
reason is that ¯nancial transactions are often concerned with risk sharing and the outcomes
are typically unpredictable. When a customer buys a computer, both the buyer and the
seller agree that the computer should work and they agree on the de¯nition of what this
means. Furthermore, it is relatively easy for the seller to o®er a warranty that will insure
the purchaser against failure. A certain fraction of computers sold will not work but there
is no aggregate risk. By contrast, a ¯rm buying a complex security faces a wide range of
possible outcomes and the intermediary cannot insure against all of them. For example, if
there is a change in interest rates this may a®ect most of the derivatives sold by the ¯rm.
In fact, it is rarely optimal for one party to bear all of the risk. Because of the uncertainty
it is harder to be clear about what is anticipated by the two parties as a result of a complex
¯nancial transaction, so ¯nancial arrangements seem to be more opaque and to o®er more
scope for problems than other kinds of transactions.
In this paper, we are interested in developing a model of the emerging paradigm which
captures the symbiotic relationship between markets and intermediaries and shows how
participation costs, and in particular the information costs of using markets are reduced. In
order to make clear what is going on we begin our analysis in Section 2 with a simple risk
sharing problem which corresponds to the traditional paradigm. In subsequent sections we
consider progressively more complex situations with the ¯nal model corresponding to the
emerging paradigm. In Section 2 we assume that the market provides incomplete hedging in
the sense that the security traded in the market leaves some unexploited opportunities for
risk sharing. The intermediary's role is to provide a tailor-made (explicit) insurance contract
that supplements the hedging properties of the security traded on the market. There is a
trade-o® between the higher costs of the tailor-made contract and the lower costs of the
standard security traded on the market. How much of the surplus accrues to the investor
depends on bargaining power and competition from the market and other intermediaries.
Whereas Section 2 assumes that the contract between the investor and the intermediary
is explicit (written) and enforceable, Section 3 assumes that complete contracts are not
feasible. If insurance is to be provided it must be in the form of an implicit (unwritten)
contract. Because this insurance contract is only implicit (not written down), it cannot be
enforced by third parties such as the courts. In that case, how does the investor know that
she can rely on the intermediary? In the static model of Section 2, an implicit insurance
arrangement would not be self-enforcing: if the investor su®ers a loss in one state of nature
the intermediary has no incentive to make it good. If the relationship is on-going, however,
and the intermediary values the relationship, it may be in the intermediary's interest to abide
by the implicit agreement, rather than renege and put an end to the relationship. In Section
3, we see how an implicit contract can be made self-enforcing in a long-term relationship.
The amount of insurance that can be provided ex ante will be limited ex post by the value
of the ongoing relationship. If the amount of money transferred between the parties ex post
is greater than the value of the relationship, the party that is required to pay will dissolve
the relationship rather than pay up. This has the interesting implication that an increase
4in competition which reduces ex post payo®s to the intermediary will reduce the scope for
implicit contracts.
In Section 4 we turn to the central question of the paper, which is how an intermediary can
reduce investors' participation costs and in particular their cost of acquiring information. It
is not simply a matter of the intermediary passing \facts" to the ¯rm or investor. We assume
that evaluating the outcome of a ¯nancial contract in di®erent states of nature is costly. We
distinguish between salient states, that can be appreciated by everyone, and obscure states
that can be understood only by experts. Writing a complete contingent contract does not
solve this problem, because including obscure states simply makes it harder for the customer
to evaluate the contract. Formally, customers take an attitude of extreme risk aversion
toward obscure states and hence toward any security or contract that contains contingencies
based on obscure states. The intermediary can reduce participation costs by providing an
implicit agreement to insure the customer. If things turn out badly, there is a possibility
for renegotiation. In e®ect, the intermediary, by providing insurance against \unforeseen
contingencies" (obscure states) reduces the need for the investor to have information in the
¯rst place.
The implications of our analysis for improving the e®ectiveness of relationships in the
¯nancial services industry is discussed in Section 5. Since it is crucial for relationships
to be successful that parties have some surplus at stake, attempts at increasing the scope
of relationships should focus on combining pro¯table lines of business. Finally, Section 6
contains concluding remarks.
The paper is related to a number of strands of the literature. Merton (1989) justi¯ed
the use of continuous time techniques which assume no frictions by distinguishing between
intermediaries and individual investors and ¯rms. He suggested intermediaries could trade at
almost zero marginal costs in markets. These intermediaries could rebundle payo® streams
for individual investors who would pay a price for this service. He focused on intermediaries
activities in markets whereas we focus on their interaction with unsophisticated investors.
The existing literature on the importance of relationships and implicit contracts for inter-
mediaries has a rather di®erent focus to ours. Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) consider
the generation of information during relationships between banks and borrowers and the
possibility for ex post exploitation of the monopoly rents these contracts lead to. They show
how ex ante competition limits the potential amount that can be extracted and the e®ect
this has on loan rates and choices of ¯nancing. In contrast, in our model there is not a
problem with opportunistic behavior. Instead relationships are bene¯cial because they can
provide implicit insurance. Boot and Thakor (1996) consider the e®ect of competition on
the composition of bank lending between transaction loans which are like capital market
funding and relationship loans which are like traditional lending. They are able to show the
surprising result that relationship lending increases with competition. Their focus is thus on
the composition of banks' activities whereas ours is on the interaction between explicit and
implicit contracts.
52 Risk Sharing with Complete Information
The traditional paradigm of ¯nancial markets and ¯nancial intermediaries stresses three
di®erences. First, markets o®er the opportunity to trade standard securities, whereas in-
termediaries can tailor securities to the needs of the individual investor or ¯rm. Secondly,
markets are more competitive than intermediaries and so o®er services to ¯rms and investors
at lower cost. Finally, to the extent that information is an important element of transaction
costs, intermediaries can exploit increasing returns to scale and o®er information at lower
per capita cost, whereas by de¯nition everyone bears his own cost of becoming informed
in markets. We review these arguments brie°y before presenting our own extension of the
paradigm.
2.1 Standard versus tailor-made securities
Markets need to maintain liquidity in order to attract traders. As a result, we observe
active markets for a relatively small fraction of the set of all conceivable securities. On the
other hand, intermediaries can design securities for speci¯c customers and speci¯c needs.
For example, a wide range of securities can be obtained from investment banks such as
Goldman Sachs for a price. So one advantage of intermediaries is that they provide tailor-
made securities.
Even though markets provide a limited number of securities, it may be argued that it
is possible to synthesize a large number of di®erent securities by adopting dynamic trading
strategies involving a small number of actively traded securities; but this requires a lot of
expertise, which a small investor or ¯rm may not have. An intermediary can provide the
security directly, saving the investor or ¯rm the trouble of ¯guring out the trading strategy
(Merton (1989)).
Even when the product being o®ered by the intermediary is \vanilla-°avored", the in-
termediary may still be able to o®er services tailored to the needs of the customer that a
market cannot. For example, in the U.K. and other European countries, the relationship
with the bank manager is important, because even small depositors and borrowers expect
the privileges of relationship banking, although the products being o®ered are not very so-
phisticated.
2.2 Competition
Perhaps the greatest advantage of ¯nancial markets is that they come close to the economist's
ideal of perfect competition. In other words, they o®er great cost advantages to the ¯rm
or investor. In dealing with an intermediary, the ¯rm or investor has to bargain \one on
one" and there are several reasons why the intermediary may have considerable bargaining
power. In the ¯rst place, the intermediary may have market power if there is a relatively
small number of intermediaries. Also, the intermediary may have information about the
¯rm or investor and about the ¯nancial product that allows it to extract surplus. There are
6various kinds of lock-in e®ects|if there are costs of switching to another intermediary or if
there is a lemons e®ect when the relationship ends|and the intermediary can exploit this
to extract rents (Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992)).
A related issue is that the investor or ¯rm may be the victim of moral hazard because
it lacks information about what the intermediary is doing. In that case, too, intermediaries
may turn out to be costly.
An additional argument is that markets are not merely more competitive, they are ac-
tually cheaper, for example, because they can tap a larger pool of resources and so reduce
the cost of raising funds. It appears that one of the reasons the junk bond market was
so successful initially was that it allowed a signi¯cant reduction in the cost of funds raised
compared to bank ¯nance.
For all these reasons, markets are often thought to o®er substantial cost advantages to
the investor or ¯rm.
2.3 Returns to scale
Intermediaries may also be able to lower the costs of investors and ¯rms by providing infor-
mation. Here the advantage comes from increasing returns to scale. Once the intermediary
has paid the ¯xed cost of acquiring information, it can provide it to all its customers at
nearly zero marginal cost (Diamond (1984)).
An alternative is to package risk in such a way that it is easier to evaluate than the
securities provided by the market. Markets can also do this to some extent (cf. Boot and
Thakor (1993) and Du±e and DeMarzo (1995)), but since di®erent individuals have di®erent
information available, it may be impossible for markets to duplicate this function in the form
of standard securities.
2.4 A simple risk-sharing problem
There are many reasons why a limited set of securities is o®ered in organized markets.
² Complexity. It may be very expensive to write complex contracts, so the market
provides only simple contracts, which is what most investors want.
² Liquidity. In order to maintain a viable market, the volume of trade must be large
enough to allow the market makers to cover their ¯xed costs and to ensure su±cient
market depth to avoid excessive price volatility. This may not possible for very exotic
securities, with the result that we tend to observe a limited set of securities. (Pagano
(1989) and Allen and Gale (1994)).
² Legal uncertainty. One of the barriers to the introduction of new securities is the un-
certainty about how the legal system will treat them. As a result, there is a preference
for securities on which there is a settled body of case law. This necessarily limits the
selection of contracts on o®er.
7² Gains from standardization. Trading securities requires general knowledge about classes
of securities, stocks, bonds, options, futures, etc. as well as speci¯c knowledge about in-
dividual securities, mean return, variance, beta, etc. As a result, information costs are
reduced by dealing in standard securities and this may also discourage the introduction
of new securities. (Gale (1992)).
As was pointed out above, one advantage of intermediaries is that they can tailor security
design to the individual customer. In e®ect, they make markets more complete. In this
section, we take for granted the incompleteness of risk sharing provided by the market and
investigate the potential for an intermediary to provide a tailor made insurance contract. We
analyze this benchmark case as a simple risk sharing problem, in which it is assumed that
the intermediary and the customer are symmetrically informed and can write an explicit,
enforceable contract. In later sections, we relax these assumptions, one by one.
Suppose that the customer, which could be a ¯rm or an investor, wants to hedge the risk
of a random income. Risk preferences are represented by von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
functions u(x) for the customer and v(y) for the intermediary. The customer receives income
w(s) in state s. There is a market in which a security f is traded. This security pays a net
return f(s) in state s, where the net return includes the price of the security as well as any
commissions and fees. Without loss of generality, we can scale the security's payo®s so that
the customer wants to trade exactly one unit in equilibrium. Then, if it trades the security
f on the market, its net income will be f(s) + w(s) in state s and its expected utility will
be E[u(f + w)] =
P
p(s)u(f(s) + w(s)) where p(s) is the probability of state s.
Now suppose the customer went instead to the intermediary and wanted to hedge the risk
w. We ignore other income for the intermediary, so if the intermediary wants to sell a security
g to the customer, its income is simply ¡g(s) in state s. With no further information, the
expected utilities of the customer and intermediary, conditional on trading the security g,
will be E[u(g(s) + w(s))] and E[v(¡g(s))], respectively. The particular security chosen by
the intermediary has two functions, to share risks e±ciently and to provide the maximum
payo® to the intermediary. If the intermediary has all the bargaining power, it maximizes
its own payo® subject to the constraint that the customer can always go to the market:
maxg E[v(¡g(s))]
s.t. E[u(g(s) + w(s))] ¸ E[u(f(s) + w(s))]:
Depending on the context, the customer may have some bargaining power. For example, the
customer may extract informational rents if the intermediary does not know its reservation
utility. In that case, the surplus will be shared in a less extreme way. In any case, the
contract chosen will be e±cient.
The bottom line is that the intermediary can improve risk sharing by tailoring the security
to the customer's needs, but may or may not share the gains with the customer.
This may not be the whole story, however. In the ¯rst place, the intermediary may have
higher costs than the market. For example, if there is a ¯xed cost c > 0 of writing a tailor-
made security (i.e. a complete contract), then the intermediary's payo® is E[v(¡g(s) ¡ c)]
8and if the intermediary's reservation utility is v(0), then even if the customer has all of the
bargaining power, the most that it can obtain is
max E[u(g(s) + w(s))]
s.t. E[v(¡g(s) ¡ c)] ¸ v(0)
which may be less than E[u(f(s)+w(s))]. Even if there is positive surplus, the intermediary
needs something less than full bargaining power to make the ¯rm no better o® than it would
be dealing in the market. A similar issue arises if the intermediary's cost of funds is greater
than the market's. That will also appear as a cost that must be subtracted from g in order
to de¯ne the intermediary's payo®.
The essential issue in the type of situation considered is the trade-o® between the costs
and bene¯ts of markets and intermediaries. For some investors and ¯rms, intermediaries
may be superior while for others markets are superior. The existence of both intermediaries
and markets allows all agents to choose the least-cost method of lending or borrowing funds.
In analyzing the risk-sharing problem, we have assumed that the customer and the inter-
mediary write an explicit and enforceable contract. However, the costs that make complete
markets an implausible assumption may also make complete explicit contracts unrealistically
expensive too. One way of getting around this problem is to assume that the intermediary
and the customer do not have an explicit (written) contract, but rather have an implicit
(unwritten) understanding about what might happen if a \bad outcome" occurs.
This solution raises another problem, however. If the implicit contract between the
intermediary and customer is unwritten and hence unenforceable by a third party, why should
the customer believe that the intermediary will keep the terms of the implicit contract? In
a one-shot contracting problem, unenforceability may prevent any insurance from being
o®ered by the intermediary. In the context of a long-term relationship, however, it may be
possible to sustain insurance through a self-enforcing implicit contract, in which the value
of the ongoing relationship to the intermediary provides an incentive to abide by the terms
of the agreement, rather than renege and end the relationship. However, the amount of
insurance that can be o®ered in a self-enforcing way will be limited by the value of the
ongoing relationship. We study this in the next section.
3 Relationships and Implicit Insurance
3.1 Sustainable relationships
The model of the previous section is extended to allow for the possibility of long-term rela-
tionships and implicit contracts. As before there are two parties to a risk-sharing contract, a
customer and an intermediary. There is a sequence of dates t = 1;2;::: and a new risk-sharing
opportunity at each date. The written contract is a function f(st), where f(st) is the amount
of money paid by the intermediary to the customer if st is observed at date t. The customer's
random income is w(st). In the absence of any other transfers, the expected utility of the
customer is E[u(w(st) + f(st))] and the expected utility of the intermediary, ignoring other
9risks to which the intermediary may be subject, is E[v(¡f(st))]. To keep things simple, we
assume that fstg is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with p.d.f. p(st). The contract f
is taken as given, that is, it has been designed by the intermediary and represents the best
hedge that the intermediary could write for the customer. The question now is how much
better can the intermediary and the customer do by entering into an implicit risk-sharing
arrangement?
Let h(st) be the transfer that is paid by the intermediary to the customer in state st
as a result of this implicit agreement. Reputational issues may be su±cient to sustain the
relationship. If the intermediary reneges on its part of the bargain it will lose its reputation
and the possibility of future business. In the same way, a customer that reneges on its
part of the bargain will ¯nd it di±cult to get an intermediary to o®er implicit insurance
in the future. Without modeling this part of the story formally, we assume that there is
no possibility of either party ¯nding another partner if it reneges on its part of the implicit
contract. On the other hand, we assume that the customer can always resort to the formal
contract as a security level. For this reason, even if the customer is restricted to dealing
with this intermediary, the customer has a level of expected utility below which the implicit
contract cannot push it in any state of nature. Let
u
¤ = E[u(w(st) + f(st) + h(st))]
be the ex ante expected utility of the customer in each period when there is implicit insurance
and let
u
¤¤ = E[u(w(st) + f(st))]
be the corresponding value without implicit insurance. Then the participation constraint for
the customer is
u(w(st) + f(st) + h(st)) +
u¤
r
¸ u(w(st) + f(st)) +
u¤¤
r
where r is the customer's discount rate. The left hand side of the inequality is the expected
utility of continuing the implicit insurance while the right hand side is the expected utility
of deviating this period and ending it. This inequality puts a lower bound on the value of
h(st) that is a function of st and u¤, call it H(st;u¤;u¤¤). Assuming that competition among
intermediaries leads them to maximize the expected utility of the customer subject to some
period opportunity cost v¤¤ (we assume for simplicity that each intermediary can deal with
at most one customer), the equilibrium implicit contract has to solve the following problem:
max u¤ = E[u(w(st) + f(st) + h(st))]
s.t. h(st) ¸ H(st;u¤;u¤¤);8st
E[v(¡f(st) ¡ h(st))] ¸ v¤¤
This is an equilibrium problem, since the participation constraint depends on the expected
utility that is available from continuing the relationship, which in turn is the value of the
maximization problem.
10The ¯rst-order conditions that must be satis¯ed by the solution to this problem are
u
0(st + f(st) + h(st)) = ¸v




0(st + f(st) + h(st)) ¸ ¸v
0(¡f(st) ¡ h(st)) if h(st) = H(st;u
¤;u
¤¤)
where ¸ is the Lagrange multiplier on the intermediary's participation constraint.
The ¯rst condition applies in states where the optimal insurance payment is consistent
with the customer's participation constraint. The second condition applies if the risk sharing
transfer is constrained by the future surplus obtained from the relationship.
3.2 The e®ect of competition on relationships
The value of the implicit insurance contract is revealed by the fact that u¤ > u¤¤ when-
ever f(st) is not itself an optimal contract. However, there may be other constraints on
the contract. The more opportunities either party has to renege, the tighter the ex post
participation constraint will be and the lower the value of u¤ relative to u¤¤. Possibilities for
reneging reduce the future surplus and hence the level of transfer the implicit insurance can
involve.
In the preceding section, we assumed that the only alternative to complying with the
terms of an implicit contract was for the customer to renege and accept the loss of implicit
insurance. Neither the customer nor the intermediary was allowed to abandon the relation-
ship and take up with another party. This could be equilibrium behavior if every other
customer and intermediary were willing to punish a customer or intermediary who reneged
on such an agreement, but it is not entirely clear (because we have not explicitly modelled
it) that this would be supported by an equilibrium. In any case, it seems likely that in most
explicit formulations the more competitors there are on each side of the market and the more
anonymous the market becomes, the less likely it is that any customer or intermediary will
be punished for reneging on an implicit agreement. The more outside options each party
has available, the tighter the (ex post) participation constraints become and the lower the
(ex ante) expected utility from the implicit contract.
Suppose, to take an extreme case, that customers can switch intermediaries whenever
it suits them. This requires in particular that the written contract f does not include any
penalties for terminating the relationship or any bonding devices such as payment of fees
and commissions to the intermediary in advance. Then the ex post participation constraint
takes the form
u(w(st) + f(st) + h(st)) +
u¤
r
¸ u(w(st) + f(st)) +
u¤
r
or h(st) ¸ 0. In other words, the implicit insurance contract can never require the customer
to make a transfer to the intermediary. This is a tighter constraint, as long as u¤ > u¤¤, and so
it reduces the expected utility that can be achieved for the customer. Increased competition,
in the form of easier switching between intermediaries, makes it harder to enforce agreements
and causes a real e±ciency cost in terms of reduced risk sharing. Another way of saying the
11same thing is that the set of self-enforcing contracts is smaller and excludes the contracts
that o®er better risk sharing.
We can take this argument one step further and consider the e®ect of competition from
¯nancial markets. Since intermediaries can duplicate anything markets can o®er, the intro-
duction of a market does not introduce any new opportunities for risk sharing. Furthermore,
since intermediaries can provide at least as good products as ¯nancial markets, there is no
tightening of the ex post participation constraint. What markets may do is to change the
distribution of surplus between the customer and the intermediary. To make this very clear,
consider the case where there is initially either a monopoly intermediary or a collusive car-
tel of intermediaries that can extract all the surplus from the customer. In that case, the
implicit contract solves the problem:
max v¤ = E[v(¡f(st) ¡ h(st))]
s.t. h(st) ¸ H(st;u¤;u¤¤);8st
u¤ = E[u(w(st) + f(st) + h(st))] ¸ u¤¤ = E[u(w(st))]:
Now suppose that a ¯nancial market opens up, in which the security k is traded com-
petitively. This security may be identical to f except for the fees and commissions that are
incorporated in the de¯nition of the security and are assumed to be lower than those charged
by the intermediary. Then the customer's reservation utility changes from u¤¤ = E[u(w(st))]
to u¤¤¤ = E[u(w(st) + k(st))]. This change has two e®ects. First, it makes the customer
better o®. Secondly, it changes the ex post participation constraint. The ¯rst is a distri-
butional change and comes at the expense of the monopolistic intermediaries. The second
has e±ciency repercussions, because it restricts the risk sharing properties of the implicit
contract being o®ered by the intermediaries. So there is a trade-o® between e±ciency and
distribution. A reduction in monopoly rents may lead to a reduction in risk sharing.
4 Implicit Contracts and Reducing Participation Costs
4.1 Implicit Insurance with incomplete information
One of the things that discourages small investors and ¯rms from making use of ¯nancial
markets is the information that is needed to operate successfully in volatile and sophisticated
markets. Quite apart from the risk attached to the underlying variables that are being
hedged, there is uncertainty about the exact nature of the securities being traded, about the
behavior of the markets, the dealing process and so forth. Unsophisticated investors and
¯rms do not know what they are getting into.
Intuitively, dealing with a trusted advisor or intermediary seems to avoid some of this
risk. The intermediary can give advice on the choice of securities, but beyond this, it can
o®er some assurance that there will be no unpleasant surprises. If something unexpected
does occur, the intermediary may be willing to bear the cost or, at least, share the cost
with the ¯rm or investor. In short, dealing with an intermediary provides insurance against
non-speci¯c risks. Were an agent to operate directly in a ¯nancial market, however, there
12would be no such insurance. The agent gets what the security speci¯es, no more and no
less. For this reason, investors and ¯rms may feel much more \comfortable" dealing with
an intermediary. This is not an appeal to irrationality: the fact that one has a relationship
with the intermediary provides insurance.
In Section 2 we considered the traditional paradigm where the choice by each agent
between markets and intermediaries is determined by which involves the least cost. In
Section 3 we assumed that the contract was implicit, on the assumption that this avoided
some of the costs of writing a complex contract, and showed how improved risk sharing might
be sustained in a long-term relationship. In this section we go on to develop a model of the
emerging paradigm where markets and intermediaries have a symbiotic relationship. Agents
need intermediaries to make e®ective use of markets and markets need intermediaries to be
viable. Whereas in the traditional paradigm there is a clear cut distinction between ¯nancial
markets and intermediaries, in the emerging paradigm this distinction is more blurred.
One of the costs of going to the market is the cost of becoming informed about the
securities traded and about the market mechanism itself. Suppose that the customer does
not know what the security f is, that is, it is uncertain not just about the state of nature s
that will eventually be revealed, but also about the value of the security in state s. In this
case, the intermediary may be able to o®er the customer insurance about the nature of the
security by promising to compensate the customer for any \unpleasant surprises".
This has the additional advantage that the intermediary is taking advantage of the mar-
ket's lower costs by piggy-backing on the standard security f. So the customer is trading f
indirectly through the intermediary and getting an additional security h = g ¡ f that has
two functions, one being to customize the standard security f to the customer's individual
needs and the second being to relieve the customer of the need to obtain extra information
about the nature of the security f.
How are we to interpret the transfers h = g ¡ f? They could take the form of cash
payments but need not. They could take the form of some readjustment of the terms of the
contract f. Or, if the customer and the intermediary do business repeatedly, h may take
the form of an adjustment in the terms of a subsequent transaction. If the customer gets
\burned" on one deal, it may receive favorable terms on the next deal as compensation.
Or the intermediary may provide services in lieu of direct compensation, for example, it
could arrange a loan if the customer is facing liquidity problems because the last deal turned
out badly. Or the intermediary may pay for the cost of some action to make the customer
whole after it su®ers some damage because of an unanticipated outcome from a previous
transaction. On occasion the customer may require compensation in cash. In some cases
this may involve legal action, but this does not have to be the norm.
4.2 Risk, Uncertainty, and Implicit Insurance
To clarify some of the ideas introduced above, it will be necessary to have a slightly richer
model. Suppose that f is the security traded in the market and that the outcome of f
depends on two types of contingencies or states. The ¯rst type of state we call salient and
13the second we call obscure. The salient states consist of contingencies the individual investor
or ¯rm is likely to think of and understand when evaluating a security; the obscure states
consist of those which are not consciously brought to mind at the time a decision is made.
Ex post, both kinds of states are observable. In fact, we may consider both to be salient ex
post because it will be clear that they have a®ected the outcome in a particular way. Let S
denote the ¯nite set of salient states. For each state s 2 S the ¯nite set of obscure states
is T(s). The probability of a salient state s is p(s) and the conditional probability of an
obscure state t given s is ¼(tjs). It is important to note that the division of contingencies
into salient and obscure states is subjective, that is, it depends on the ¯rm or individual in
question and may vary from one to another.
For simplicity, we assume that the customer's income risk depends only on the salient
states and that the customer has well de¯ned probabilities attached to these states. The
customer behaves like a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximizer with respect
to states s 2 S where T(s) contains one element so there is no obscurity. On the other
hand, when T(s) contains more than one element the obscure states represent a source
of uncertainty in the Keynesian sense, precisely because they are not being consciously
scrutinized. It is less clear how the customer should respond to this uncertainty. We assume
that for obscure states the customer attaches a very low utility denoted u. There are a
number of formal ways this can be justi¯ed. For simplicity and the sake of illustrating the
general idea, suppose that the customer acts like an in¯nitely risk-averse individual when
confronted with this kind of uncertainty, that is, if f(s;t) is the payo® to the security in the
combined state (s;t), then the customer acts as if the outcome were f0(s) ´ inft2Tff(s;t)g
in state s and proceeds to calculate the expected utility of the security f0 in the usual way.
The utility of f0 in state s is u. This rather pessimistic way of evaluating the security is not
likely to make the customer very keen to trade the security. In many cases, the optimum
response may be to choose the quantity µ = 0. Note that in¯nite risk aversion does not
lead the ¯rm to sell the security short: when µ < 0 the ¯rm's pessimism will take the form
of replacing f with f0(s) ´ supt2Tff(s;t)g. Hence unlike standard expected utility theory
the model is consistent with the fact that a large proportion of potential investors do not
participate in standard ¯nancial markets at all (cf. Dow and Werlang (1992)). For example,
Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) ¯nd that only a small proportion of investors participate in the
stock market; in their sample of those with liquid assets in excess of $100,000 only 47.7
percent held stocks.
The existence of obscure states and the uncertainty to which they give rise is a barrier
to the participation of unsophisticated individuals in ¯nancial markets. But why should
securities depend on obscure states in the ¯rst place? There are at least two reasons. The
¯rst is that it may not be possible to provide securities that avoid obscure states altogether.
Salience and obscurity are subjective: what is salient to one individual may not be salient
to another because of a di®erence in background or expertise. Second, the incompleteness of
the set of securities exacerbates the problem by reducing the set of securities from which the
individual has to choose. The formulas which can be written down in a legally enforceable
contract may inevitably involve contingencies that are obscure to some individuals; the case
14law that is likely to determine how contracts are enforced in practice may be obscure to all
but a few lawyers specializing in an area; and so on.
This is where the intermediary can provide a valuable service. It can insure the individual
or ¯rm against obscure contingencies, thus reducing or eliminating the uncertainty that
lowers the value of the security. Note that this does not require the intermediary to write
a contract that is in some sense more detailed or complete than the security o®ered in the
market. The insurance can be implicit in the relationship between the intermediary and
the customer. What the intermediary is o®ering the customer is a substitute contract that
pays the customer the certain amount f1(s) in state s rather than the uncertain amount
f(s;t). For example, f1(s) may be the mean of f(s;t) according to the intermediary's beliefs
about the distribution of t. This security f1 can do a perfectly adequate job of hedging
against the risk in y(s), which depends only on the salient state s. Of course, the legally
binding contract is f; the di®erence between f and f1 is something that the customer cannot
quite understand, but that does not matter since only f1 needs to be taken into account in
the outcome. The important point is that the implicit contract is based on states that the
customer and the intermediary can both fully distinguish. The extent to which customers
can rely on the implicit contract will depend on the pro¯tability of the ongoing relationship
versus the bene¯t of reneging as before. The di®erence is that now customers are unaware
of the bene¯t of reneging. In making their decision customers must rely on the information
available to them such as previous experience on reneging with contracts of this type.
In the next subsection, we extend this simple view of implicit insurance to allow for
information acquisition.
4.3 The Operation of Markets with Ex Ante Information
Consider a contracting problem between an intermediary and a customer. As before, suppose
that the intermediary is designing a risk sharing arrangement with the customer. The
intermediary has the expertise to identify both salient and obscure states. The customer
can only identify salient states. This has the important implication that explicit contracts
cannot be used to provide insurance to the unsophisticated against obscure states. The
customer has no idea how to interpret such contracts and will simply assign a low utility to
them. Implicit contracts must therefore be used to insure against outcomes in obscure states
since explicit contracts cannot be used.
Consider the use of securities traded in the market ¯rst. As usual the unsophisticated
customer faces a random income w(s) in state s so if it trades the security f its net income
will be f(s;t) + w(s) in state (s;t). We ignore other income for the intermediary in the
usual way, so its income is simply ¡f(s;t) in state (s;t). With no further information, the
expected utilities of the customer and intermediary, conditional on trading the randomly




15respectively. There are two sources of uncertainty here, of course, one arising from the
uncertainty about the salient state and the other arising from uncertainty about the obscure
state t. The uncertainty about the salient state of nature will be resolved at some time in the
future and we shall have no more to say about it here. On the other hand, we assume that
for some cost information is available to customers about the obscure states t for each salient
state s. One way of capturing the possibility of reducing uncertainty about the nature of
f(s;t) is to assume that, for some ¯xed cost c > 0, and for some state s the customer can
observe the true value of f(s;t) for all states t. If the number of salient states is large it
will never be optimal to pay this cost and learn the entire security f(s;t) but depending on
the circumstances it may pay to learn in some states. For each state s where information
is acquired it is possible to calculate expected utility in the standard way. For other states
where the cost c is not incurred, the utility assigned is u:
The problem of evaluating f can be regarded as a search problem. If the security is











where #© denotes the number of elements of ©. The value of information comes from the
possibility of making the trade conditional on the information, in which case the customer
gets the maximum of U(fj©) and E[u(w(s) ¡ #©c)]. The optimal choice of © maximizes
E[maxfU(fj©);E[u(w(s) ¡#©c)]g]:
Investing in information only makes sense if it sometimes changes the decision to buy the
security. If it does not, there is no gain and the customer would be better o® not paying
the cost of evaluating the contract. For this reason, there is the usual well known non-
convexity in the objective function. If there is a large number of individually insigni¯cant
states of nature, information about any one state is unlikely to make a di®erence to the
decision whether to accept the contract or not. Therefore, a small amount of information,
for example, information about the contract's payo® in a single state, may have no value.
Clearly, an intermediate amount of information may a®ect the decision and therefore has
a positive value. So there must be increasing returns to information over some range. On
the other hand, when a large amount of information has been collected, getting information
about an additional state is unlikely to have much e®ect on the decision, so the marginal
value of information is decreasing beyond some point.
For c = 0 complete contingent contracts will be optimal. Both sides will understand
exactly how the contract will work in each state and all possibilities for risk sharing will be
exploited by the contract. In that case relationships will have no role to play.
For moderate c, the states which are likely to occur will be checked out but some states
will not be investigated. Ex post there will be\surprises" in the sense that for those states not
checked out the actual utility obtained will be di®erent from that anticipated. The optimal
16expenditure on checking how the contract will work involves trading o® the transaction costs
against the risk of surprises.
For su±ciently high c; no checking will be done. In this case the basic underlying risk
concerning salient states will be compounded by the risk of how the contract will work which
depends on obscure factors. Surprises will occur frequently.
Depending on the level of c and the cost of surprises in terms of the risk, there may be
no trade at all if
E¼[u(f(s) + w(s))] + E¼[v(¡f(s))] < E[u(w(s)] + v(0):
This might be true in spite of the fact that the security does have some genuine risk-sharing
bene¯ts, simply because of the customers' uncertainty about the actual outcome in some
states and the costs of eliminating this uncertainty.
4.4 Intermediaries and Ex ante versus Ex Post Checking
The essential problem with using contracts in the framework developed above is that the
costs of evaluation are borne ex ante. This means that many states are checked out even
though ex post only one will occur. This raises the obvious possibility of improving the
allocation of resources by dispensing with the ex ante checking and having some type of
insurance should a surprise occur. The di±culty, of course, is how this type of insurance
can be provided. Explicit contracts based on obscure information cannot be evaluated by
unsophisticated investors. When confronted with contracts which attempt to condition on
obscure states they will simply assign u unless they incur the costs of checking. This is where
the implicit insurance allowed by relationships is important. Customers may be willing to
forego ex ante checking because they understand that if there is a problem the intermediary
will eliminate or share the risk of any surprises. As a result they may be willing to trade
even though explicit contracts alone would not provide any surplus. The implicit ex post
insurance allowed by relationships means that the ex ante costs of complex explicit contracts
can be avoided.
To illustrate this in terms of the model developed suppose the explicit written contract
provides a payo® f(s;t). The implicit contract is such that the net payment to the customer
is
f1(s) = f(s;t) ¡ h(s;t)
In other words, the customer is provided with a payo® that can be understood ex ante.
There is no need to undertake complex checking ex ante. The implicit insurance provided
by the intermediary means customers don't have to incur the costs of investigating obscure
possibilities. By insuring against these possibilities the intermediary can potentially provide
a huge saving in costs and/or increase the funds people are willing to invest in markets.
There are various ways in which implicit insurance contracts can be executed. After
an unexpected outcome, the aggrieved party may engage in bargaining with the counter-
party, threatening to take his business elsewhere or to create unfavorable publicity until
17the intermediary makes amends. In some cases, a legal action may be brought against the
intermediary. Whatever form the \renegotiation" takes, it is part of the implicit contract
that is played out over time. We can imagine that all of this is anticipated by the parties
when they write the explicit contract. The real contract is the anticipated mapping from
states of nature to payo®s, not the written contract, and it is the real contract that has to
be evaluated and enforced. Formally, this is equivalent to an explicit contract with the same
contingent payo®s, but the crucial di®erence is the cost of writing and enforcing the contract.
The long-term relationship with its implicit insurance is just a cheaper way of achieving a
particular pattern of state-contingent payo®s.
5 Strategies for Implementing Relationships
The previous sections have shown how the ex ante costs of explicit contracts can sometimes
be avoided by the development of long lasting relationships and implicit insurance between
intermediaries and ¯rms or consumers. A question of some interest to providers of ¯nancial
services is how relationships can best be structured to maximize these bene¯ts from implicit
insurance.
In the U.S. in recent years a number of intermediaries have tried to construct \¯nancial
supermarkets" where consumers can obtain a whole range of ¯nancial services from the
same providers. For example, in the 1980's Sears bought Dean Witter and a number of other
specialist ¯nancial service ¯rms. At one point it was o®ering a full range of services including
FDIC insured deposits, consumer loans, credit cards, mortgage banking, commercial lending,
mutual funds, brokerage services for securities and insurance. American Express combined
with Shearson and Lehmann and a number of other ¯rms and o®ered a similar range of
¯nancial services. Ultimately, these strategies were unsuccessful in the sense that the groups
were broken up and returned to competing separately. In addition to attempts to extend
relationships between intermediaries and consumers there have also been attempts to extend
relationships between intermediaries and ¯rms. One example of this is the recent creation
of Section 20 subsidiaries to perform investment banking services by many large commercial
banks. The merger between Banker's Trust and Alex Brown in 1997 is another example of
this type of strategy.
In many European countries such as Germany it has long been the case that universal
banks have provided a whole array of services to both consumers and ¯rms. On the consumer
side, in addition to standard banking accounts and loans, insurance and other types of
¯nancial service are o®ered. On the ¯rm side, loans and underwriting services are often
provided. Relationships are wider in scope and much more important than in the U.S.
The model of relationships developed above can be used to shed some light on when
strategies of extending the scope of relationships are likely to be successful. The result
of Section 3 that increased competition reduces the amount of implicit insurance that is
possible with relationships indicates that it is essentially the available future surplus which
is important. The more future surplus at stake the higher the transfers that are incentive
compatible and hence the more implicit insurance there can be. By extending the scope of
18relationships and putting a greater amount of future surplus at stake the more valuable the
relationships can be made. For example, suppose a bank is providing loans to consumers
and a mutual fund is providing investment products. Both have long term relationships with
their customers. The extent of risk sharing through implicit contracts that can be achieved
by both ¯rms is limited by the future stream of pro¯ts each will separately expect to earn
in the future. To the extent the current outcomes in each and hence the need for transfers
under the implicit insurance arrangement are independent there will be a gain to combining
the two and forming a more extensive relationship with customers. Now the transfer to
provide the implicit insurance that can take place in each division will depend on the future
pro¯ts in the combined entity. In states where both divisions need transfers simultaneously
it cannot be worse to have the two combined and in states where only one division requires
a transfer a strict improvement in the implicit insurance can be obtained.
This argument is consistent with the observation that extensive relationships involved
in universal banking have been successful in Europe while ¯nancial supermarkets have been
unsuccessful in the U.S. In Europe there is not much competition in ¯nancial services while
in the U.S. there typically is. Combining relationships will only be successful to the extent
large future streams of pro¯ts are put at risk which happens in Europe but not in the U.S.
In order for intermediaries in the U.S. to be successful when creating broader relationships
the objective should be to put together pro¯table services and not just give consumers a wide
range of products. The ¯nancial supermarkets that have been constructed have really just
given consumers convenience through \one stop shopping" they have not provided more
implicit insurance because each individual line is fairly competitive. For consumers one stop
shopping for ¯nancial services does not appear to be very valuable and thus the mergers
have been unsuccessful. The results above suggest that combining commercial banking and
investment banking in the U.S. may be more successful. The reason is that there are areas of
both which are highly pro¯table and hence extended implicit insurance should be possible.
6 Concluding Remarks
Financial markets have become increasingly important over the last few decades. However,
they have mostly become markets for intermediaries rather than markets for individuals
and ¯rms. We have argued that one of the main reasons for this change is that increased
participation costs in markets have meant that individuals and ¯rms have withdrawn from
markets and rely increasingly on intermediaries. If complex complete contracts were used
between intermediaries and their customers there would be no gain because of the extensive
ex ante costs of checking how the contracts will operate. Instead customers can rely on the
implicit insurance made possible by long-term relationships. Households and ¯rms know that
if there is a surprise the intermediary will share the risk. Such risk sharing is only possible
if both parties will bene¯t from the relationship in the future. This means that competition
by intermediaries may be undesirable if it reduces future pro¯ts and hence the amount of
risk sharing that can occur. It also suggests that when choosing strategies to maximize the
bene¯ts of relationships ¯rms should be concerned with o®ering a range of pro¯table services
19rather than simply expanding the number of services available.
Throughout the discussion of explicit and implicit contracts, we took the explicit written
contracts as exogenously given. This is obviously a gross oversimpli¯cation. There are
complex issues to be discussed about how these contracts are written and how they interact
with the implicit contract. Only one issue will be mentioned here, but it illustrates a wider
class of issues. There are gains to locking in the customer in order to provide better insurance
to both the customer and the intermediary. One way of doing this is by getting the customer
to post a bond by paying of fees and commissions up front. These can be thought of as an
\insurance premium" that the customer will forfeit if it switches to another intermediary or
reneges on the implicit contract and reverts to the written contract. However, the customer
may have di±culty paying this premium up front because it lacks liquidity. In that case, the
written contract can easily be amended to provide a stream of payments to the intermediary.
Since this stream of payments is non-contingent, there is no problem writing it into the
contract and since the written contract is enforceable it serves as a bonding device. Further,
since the payments are spread over time it solves the ¯rms liquidity problem. However, this
change in the contract makes the ex ante value of the written contract lower and so reduces
the value of the relationship and may adversely a®ect the ex post participation constraint.
So the problem of contract and security design cannot be separated from the problem of
providing optimal implicit insurance. We do not pursue this issue here since it raises the
issue of how to write down the problem in a satisfactory way, for example, to specify the
constraints on what contracts can be written and what contracts cannot, but this is an
important problem for future research.
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